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The labor-leisure distortion of a pay-as-you-go pension system can be reduced through a 
stronger tax-benefit link or Bismarck pension system. Distortions of the fertility decision can 
be reduced through the introduction of a stronger child-benefit or child pension system. 
Within our optimal taxation framework, we find a Corlett-Hague result regarding the optimal 
mix of the two: if and only if children are more complementary to leisure should the tax-
benefit link be given a positive weight at the expense of the child-benefit link. The model also 
allows us to examine the infertility insurance argument that may justify redistribution from 
families with children to those without implied by most pension systems. We find that the 
opposite redistribution, from the childless to those with children, would be efficient if 
individuals have low risk aversion. Redistribution in favor of the infertile would only be 
justified when risk aversion is high. 
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I Introduction 
 
This article focuses on two important distortions that pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
systems may cause: (i) a labor-leisure distortion, and (ii) a fertility distortion.  
 
The labor-leisure distortion is caused by the implicit tax that PAYG pension schemes levy 
on wage income because average returns to PAYG contributions are typically lower than 
investing the same amount in the capital market. This is due to the implicit debt of the 
PAYG pension system that is accumulated during its introduction. In addition, the returns 
to marginal pension contributions may be further depressed as the result of a weak tax 
benefit link. It has been shown that a move from Beveridgean pension (no tax-benefit link) 
to Bismarckian pension (full tax-benefit link) reduces the implicit tax and, hence, the labor-
leisure distortion while a move from a Bismarckian to a fully funded pension system does 
not succeed in reducing the labor-leisure distortion further for all generations (Fenge 1995; 
Brunner, 1996, Sinn, 2000). 
 
But PAYG pension systems in principle also distort the fertility decision. Through the 
PAYG pension the whole parent generation benefits from earnings of each member of the 
next generation. If the benefits of children are thereby socialized while the cost of children 
remain private, the implied positive fiscal externality of having children would tend to 
distort fertility to a sub-optimal level. However, by linking the individual number of 
children and benefits in the pension formula, the fertility distortion can be eliminated as 
Kolmar (1997) and von Auer and Buettner (2005) have shown in a model with elastic 
fertility supply and inelastic labor supply.  
 
This raises the question what efficient PAYG pension systems look like when both labor 
supply and fertility are endogenous. Our present paper addresses this question within the 
modeling framework developed by Fenge and Meier (2004, 2005): the pension fund is 
divided into a contribution-related Bismarckian pension and a fertility-related child pension 
component. By increasing the weight of the Bismarck pension, the labor-leisure distortion 
can be reduced, and by increasing the share of the child pension with a strong child-benefit 
link (more precisely a strong positive link between one’s number of children and one’s 
pension benefits), the fertility distortion can be reduced. However, at the possibility 
frontier, a stronger contribution-benefit link implies a weaker child-benefit link and vice 
versa.  
 
The paper commences by developing a simple model that captures this trade-off. 
Interestingly, our model immediately yields the insight that the policy optimization 
problem at any time t is equivalent to the classic Corlett-Hague (1957) problem from 
optimal tax theory where consumption and children are two consumption goods that can be 
taxed while leisure cannot be taxed.  Hence, it is found that a pure child pension system is 
efficient when consumption and children are equally complementary to leisure. When 
children are more complementary to leisure than consumption, a more Bismarckian pension 
system is efficient. And when consumption is more complementary to leisure than children, 
then a hyper-child pension system is efficient where children are subsidized at the expense 
of consumption. If, as seems plausible, children are indeed more complementary to leisure   2
than consumption, this may help to rationalize the historical emphasis on the child-benefit 
link.  
 
Since the representative agent framework does not capture distributional objectives, a 
model with two productivity types is also discussed, relying on the papers by Edwards et al 
(1994) and Nava et al (1995) for the equivalent optimal taxation problem. Again, albeit for 
different reasons, the Bismarck pension component should be positive if children are more 
complementary to leisure than consumption.  
 
The significance of these results is further reinforced as we shown that the child pension 
discussed above is equivalent to child benefits and tax deductibility of child expenditure. 
Hence, these instruments are interchangeable within the present modeling framework, and 
the often controversial claims that one of these instruments should be favored over another 
would need to rely on additional assumptions. 
 
Finally, we extend the representative agent model by examining the optimal response to an 
ex ante infertility risk. Using a simple separability assumption, we find that the direction of 
the optimum ex-post transfer between fertile and infertile depends on the degree of the 
central planners aversion towards inequality . For a neutral attitude, we find that the optimal 
ex-post redistribution consists of a net fiscal transfer from those who remain childless to 
those with children, despite the fact that the fertile already enjoy higher utility overall. The 
reason for this is that children reduce private consumption compared to the infertile, and, as 
a result, those with children have a higher marginal utility of funds than those without 
children. Only when the degree of inequality aversion is high, would an ex-post transfer 
from the fertile to the infertile be efficient.  
 
These findings contrast with the result of Sinn (2004) who finds that some positive 
insurance against childlessness is always desirable. The underlying reason for these 
different results is that Sinn treats children as investment goods with negative expected 
financial cost, a highly relevant assumption within a historical or developing country 
context, while we treat children as consumption goods with a positive financial cost as 
might be more appropriate for today’s OECD countries.  
 
 
II The Model 
 
A standard overlapping generations model forms the basis of our considerations. Each 
generation t works and reproduces during period t and lives in retirement during period t+1.  
The lifetime utility of generation t depends on lifetime consumption in net present value 
terms t c , the number of children t k , and leisure written as total available time normalized to 
1 minus the time worked t L .   
 
The representative agent of generation t contributes to the pay-as-you go pension system at 
contribution rate  t τ , contributing a total of  t t tL w τ  where  t w  denotes the uniform wage rate 
of generation t . The net present value of the average pension of the same representative 














which is the average number of children of the members of generation t, multiplied by the 
pension contributions of each member of the next generation t+1, discounted by the 
relevant interest factor  1 + t R . A share  ) 1 ( α −  of this pension is paid out as a Bismarck 
pension where benefits are determined by individual contributions compared to the 
generation average, and a child pension where benefits are determined by the number of 
children raised compared to the generation average. The total pay-as-you go pension of the 
























































Consequently, the individual maximization problem of the representative agent of 
generation t reduces to: 
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where  t B  is the direct cost per child. For simplicity, it is assumed that the child cost is 
proportional to the number of children and that each child only has only one parent. For 
convenience, it is also assumed that the number of children  t k  is continuous. One 
interpretation of this assumption is that  t k  stands for the number of children measured in 
quality units. In addition, it is assumed that the direct cost per child  t B  is greater than the 
average pension payment per child  1 1 1 1 / + + + + t t t t R L w τ . This assures that children are a 
consumption good with a positive net cost. 
 
From the government’s perspective, a pension policy can be described as sequence of 
policy pairs{} ,... ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( 2 2 1 1 0 0 τ α τ α τ α . The obvious question to ask for any given policy 
is whether it is efficient. The traditional Pareto criterion only allows comparisons between 
states with the same individuals and therefore, a fortiori, also the same number of 
individuals. However, the policy parameters in our model generally impact fertility and 
thereby the size of the next generation.  
 
Therefore, a modified efficiency criterion is used: a pension policy is said to be efficient if 
no policy reform exists that makes at least one representative agent of the presently living 
or future generations better off while not making any representative agent of any other 
generation worse off. This efficiency criterion is in fact equivalent to the Pareto criterion if   4
it is assumed that for any generation those who remain unborn in a particular realization of 
the world have exactly the same level of utility as the representative agent of the members 
of the generation who are actually born.  
 
From a political perspective, our efficiency criterion appears reasonable. In effect, the 
Pareto criterion is applied to everybody who is at present an actor in the political economy 
sense by virtue of being alive. Already deceased generations are protected through the 
irreversibility of the past. And while potential members of future generations are not 
completely protected since they have no guarantee of being born, they are at least to some 
extent protected through the restriction that their representative agent is not to be made 
worse off. Nevertheless, solutions that are efficient in the above sense but imply a rapid 
demographic implosion or explosion should be interpreted with some caution.   
 
As a next step we define global and local efficiency of a pension policy.  
 
Definition 1: A pension policy  {} ,... ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( 2 2 1 1 0 0 τ α τ α τ α  is called globally efficient if 
no globally reformed policy {} ,... ) ~ , ~ ( ), ~ , ~ ( ), ~ , ~ ( 2 2 1 1 0 0 τ α τ α τ α  exists that is more efficient.  
 
Definition 2: And a pension policy { } ,... ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( 2 2 1 1 0 0 τ α τ α τ α  is called locally efficient if 
no local reform policy that only changes the pension parameters of a particular generation 
{} ),... , ( ), ~ , ~ ( ), , ( ,..., ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 + + − − t t t t t t τ α τ α τ α τ α τ α τ α  for any generation  0 ≥ t exist 
that is more efficient than the original policy.  
 
Clearly, a pension policy that is not locally efficient cannot be globally efficient. Hence, 
local efficiency is a necessary condition for global efficiency. However, local efficiency is 
not generally a sufficient condition for global efficiency. The essential reason for this is that 
local efficiency may be satisfied everywhere while the growth rate of the wage sum 
exceeds the interest rate for every generation – the so-called Aaron condition (Aaron, 
1966). In other words, the locally efficient policy might be dynamically inefficient and 
therefore not globally efficient since the expansion of the pay-as-you-go pension system 
would lead to an efficiency gain. However, the validity of the Aaron condition would be 
inconsistent with the small open economy assumption in the long run, provided that the rest 
of the world is to the left of the golden rule. Since the relevant issues are examined by 
Kolmar (1997), we focus on local efficiency in this paper. 
 
In order to test for local efficiency at time t, we examine the following maximization 
problem for the state: Vary the policy parameters  ) , ( t t τ α so as to maximize the utility of the 
representative agent of generation t while keeping the representative agents of all other 
generations indifferent compared to the status quo. Luckily, the policy parameters 
) , ( t t τ α only affect the utility of the representative agents of generation t and that of 
generation t-1. In fact, the utility of generation t-1 is only affected through the channel of 
the total pension contributions of generation t. Therefore, in order to keep the utility of all 
other generations constant, it suffices to introduce the additional constraint that the pension 
contributions of generation t must not vary as the policy parameters of time t are changed. 
Or more formally   5
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And since we make the small open economy assumption that { } ,... ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( 2 2 1 1 0 0 R w R w R w  
are given, this reduces further to  
 
() ()
) ~ , ~ ( ) , (
~ ~
t t t t t t t t L L
τ α τ α τ τ =          ( 2 )  
 
Consequently, the local maximization problem of the government can be written as 
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where x denotes the pension contribution of the representative agent of the t+1 generation: 
1 1 1 1 / + + + + = t t t t R L w x τ . 
 
III Equivalence Results from Optimum Taxation Theory 
 
It turns out that this local maximization problem of the government can be equivalently 
rewritten in terms of the classic optimal tax problem of Corlett-Hague (1957) where the 
state optimizes the relative tax on two consumption goods subject to the constraint that a 
total revenue of  t ρ  needs to be raised and that leisure cannot be taxed. We demonstrate this 
equivalence result by defining new terms for the optimization problem as follows: 
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By inserting these new terms, we obtain the formal equivalence to the Corlett-Hague 
optimization problem.  
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Proposition 1a:  
 
a)  If children are as complementary to leisure as consumption, then a pure child 
pension system  1 = t α is locally efficient. 
b)  If children are more complementary to leisure than consumption, then a child 
pension with weight smaller than one  1 < t α , complemented by a positive Bismarck 
pension system, is efficient. 
c)  If children are less complementary to leisure than consumption, then a child pension 
with greater weight than one  1 > t α , financed through a negative Bismarck pension 
system, is efficient.  
 
Proof: Corlett-Hague (1957) have shown that 
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From the definitions of 


































































If the utility function is additively separable in all three arguments 
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , , ( 3 2 1 t t t t t t L u k u c u L k c U − + + = − , then Proposition 1a can be reformulated as 
follows: 
 
    7
Proposition 1b:   
 
a)  If the income elasticity of the number of children is equal to the income elasticity of 
consumption, then a pure child pension system  1 = t α is locally efficient. 
b)  If the income elasticity of the number of children is children is greater than the 
income elasticity of consumption, then a child pension with weight smaller than one 
1 < t α , complemented by a positive Bismarck pension system, is efficient. 
c)  If the income elasticity of the number of children is greater than the income 
elasticity of consumption, then a child pension with greater weight greater than one 
1 > t α , financed through a negative Bismarck pension system, is efficient.  
 
Proof: According to Goldman and Uzawa (1964), Theorem 4, the Slutsky terms of a 
strongly additively separable utility function can be written as 
  ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , , ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 t t t t t t ij L u k u c u L k c x x S − + + = − =κ     
























) 1 ( , µ  
 

















This can be written as an inequality in income elasticities 
 




It is unclear whether children or consumption are more complementary to leisure at the 
margin. However, in view of the high time demands of proper parenting compared to most 
other forms of consumption, we would not be surprised if children were indeed more 
complementary to leisure than other forms of consumption. In that case, the optimal 
solution would indeed involve a positive Bismarck pension as is presently observed. 
 
Using the same strategy as before, the problem of the optimum pension mix can also be 




t w w > . By reformulating the problem in 
tax terms, we can again rely on classic result from the optimum taxation literature and 
summarized nicely in Boadway and Pestieau (2003), yielding: 
 
                                                 
1 See for example Deaton and Muehlbauer (1980), page 138.   8
Proposition 2a: If leisure is separable, a pure child pension system  1 = t α is locally 
efficient. 
 
Proof: Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976): Since leisure is assumed to be separable, distortions 
introduced by linear taxes into the consumption bundle of children and other consumption 
good would not be able to alleviate the incentive compatibility constraint between the two 
types. Hence  1 = ⇔ = t c k t t t t α . 
 
Proposition 2b: If leisure is not separable, Proposition 1 holds. 
 
Proof: See Edwards et al (1994) and Nava et al (1995) for the solution of the equivalent 
optimum taxation problem. 
 
However, an important caveat needs to be applied to the latter two results. The assumption 
of linear commodity taxes is normally justified due to the  possibility of private resale. This 
argument clearly cannot and should not be applied to the “consumption good” children. The 
government, for good reason, tracks the identity and number of children in each household. 
This opens up the possibility of non-linear elements in the taxation of children.  In 
particular, it would generally be possible to further improve welfare through the 




III Adenauer Pension 
 
The first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; Konrad Adenauer, claimed that 
the decision of having children were not subject to economic conditions: “Kinder 
bekommen die Leute immer” (transl.: “People have always children”). What implications 
does an inelastic supply of children have on a child-contingent pension? A first guess may 
be that the child factor should be reduced to zero. In the following we show that in fact a 
negative child factor will be optimal in order to reduce the implicit tax on labor incurred by 
a Bismarck pension. 
If children are supplied inelastically at  t k  then the individuals maximization problem 
reduces to: 
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At  0 = t α  the implicit tax on labor due to the pay-as-you-go pension scheme remains 
positive if the payroll growth rate is smaller than the interest rate of the capital market, i.e. 
we are in a dynamic efficient equilibrium, and if contribution rates are not increased such 
that the loss in the return of the PAYG scheme is compensated (no Ponzi game):  
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The last assumption is reasonable because there is always an upper bound for contribution 
rates, e.g. by constitutional terms against expropriation. 
 
Using again the formulation of an optimal tax problem for two commodity goods the 
following proposition can be stated 
 
Proposition 3: If children are supplied inelastically, then an Adenauer Pension ( 0 *< α ) is 
efficient.  
 
Proof: If lump-sum taxation is possible then all distortionary taxes should be zero (see e.g. 
Sandmo, 1976; Auerbach, 1985). In our framework this means that the solution to the 
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is a zero tax on consumption:  0 * =
t c t  because the tax on children 0
* >
t k t  is, by assumption, a 
lump sum instrument. Inserting the definitions of the commodity taxes yields 
 
0 ) 1 ( 1 0 1
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with  1 1 1 1 / + + + + = t t t t R L w x τ . If the implicit tax on labor is positive at the point  0 = t α  then 
the optimal child factor is negative  0
* < t α .          Q . E . D .  
 
If children are supplied inelastically, a child factor smaller than one is in fact a lump-sum 
tax on children. According to optimal tax theory this lump-sum tax should be increased up 
to the point at which the distortionary implicit tax on labor is reduced to zero. In this case 
the pension should be reduced by  * α  for each child so that the reduction of pensions adds 
to the direct cost of having children. 
 
By the same token, an inelastic supply of labor implies with endogenous fertility implies 
0
* =
t k t ,  0
* >
t c t  and therefore  1
* > t α . In other words, a hyper-child pension is efficient that 
places all tax burden on labor, reproducing the result of von Auer und Büttner (2005). 
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IV Various Instruments for Fertility Policy 
 
Child pensions are not the only instrument available to set incentives for fertility. Other 
financial incentives can be given by direct child benefits or by deducing part of the child 
rearing costs from the pension contributions. Especially the second instrument is interesting 
in order to advance child support within the pension system compared to child-contingent 
pensions. There are some reasons why families should be better off with an early financial 
support for children one of which are credit constraints of young families. In the framework 
here, however, all instruments turn out to be perfect substitutes so that there is no a priori 
reason to favor one of the instruments. 
 
Adding child benefits and the partial deductibility of child rearing costs in the model 
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t β  denotes the fraction of the child rearing costs that can be deduced from the contribution 
to the pension scheme. We require partial deductibility so that  t t t t t L w k B < β .  t γ  denotes 
the fraction of the child costs that is granted to the parents as child benefit. 
The first-order conditions of maximizing utility with respect to this budget constraint yield 
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It suffices to show that any fertility instrument can be completely substituted by either of 
the two others in an economically equivalent way if the contribution rate τ  is varied 
appropriately at the same time so that the pension of generation t-1 does not suffer.  
 
Proposition 4: All instruments for fertility policy are equivalent within the present model.  
 
Proof: It suffices to show that the child pension can be substituted by either child benefits 
or deductibility of child rearing costs. Hence, we prove that a change of policy parameters 
() ( ) t t t t t τ β τ β α ˆ , ˆ , 0 , , →  or () ( ) t t t t t τ γ τ γ α ˆ , ˆ , 0 , , →  will not change first-order conditions. 
Starting with the substitution of child pensions by deductibility of child rearing costs we 
have to prove that  
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Equation (15) implies  
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Substituting for  t τˆ  and  t β ˆ  shows that equation (16) is satisfied. 
Next we prove that child pensions can be substituted by deductibility of child rearing costs. 
Equation (14) and (16) change to  
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while equation (15) is unchanged. Equation (14’) gives  
 
1 1 1 ˆ + + + + = t t t
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γ γ  
 
Thus, substituting  t τˆ  from (17) and  t γˆ  shows that (16’) is satisfied.     Q.E.D. 
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V Insurance against infertility 
 
In literature it has been argued that public pension schemes can be viewed as an insurance 
against infertility (Sinn, 2004). If children are treated as investment goods yielding a 
pension in old age then couples who cannot have children can be insured against 
childlessness by receiving transfers from parents via a public pension scheme. 
Consumption in retirement is guaranteed by a redistribution from fertile to infertile couples.  
In the following we show that redistribution may go in the reverse direction from infertile 
to fertile individuals if the central planner’s attitude towards inequality between types is 
neutral and utility is additive separable between consumption, leisure and child demand.  
We extend the present model with a homogeneous population by assuming that an 
individual is ex ante infertile with probability θ . In equilibrium, utility and budget 
constraint of a fertile individual are given by  
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while an infertile individual obtains 
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α .  
Let us consider different attitudes towards inequality of the central planner with respect to 
childlessness: neutrality and infinite aversion. In order to capture these attitudes in a 
generalized utility function we use the CES utility function with constant elasticity of 
substitution  ρ  between the two life situations. A central planer taking account of aversion 
to inequality yields the first-best allocation by solving the following maximization problem: 
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If  1 = ρ  the central planner is neutral with respect to inequality and maximizes the 
Harsanyi welfare function. If  −∞ → ρ  the central planner is infinitely inequality averse and 
maximizes the Rawlsian maximin welfare function.    13
In case of neutrality, the first-order conditions yield that – provided a strictly concave 
utility function - consumption and leisure have to be identical in both life situations in the 
first-best solution: 
 
( ) ( ) * * *
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Note that this condition determines the number of children in the decentralized equilibrium. 
This first-best allocation can be achieved by an ex post redistribution from the infertile 
individual to the fertile individual. 
 
The sequence of events is the following. Individuals are unaware of the fact whether they 
can have children or not. The central planer determines the tax/subsidy for the individuals 
who have any positive number of children and the tax/subsidy for the individuals who have 
no children. Then individuals discover whether they are fertile or infertile and – given the 
tax-subsidy scheme – they choose their consumption and labor supply and the number of 
children if fertile.   
 
Proposition 5: If the central planner is neutral with respect to inequality between life 
situations the first-best allocation can be decentralized with a lump-sum subsidy 
* ~ F
t tk B S θ =  to the fertile individual and a lump-sum tax  ( ) * ~
1
F
t tk B T θ − =  collected from the 
infertile individual. 
 
Proof: The budget constraint of the fertile individual changes to  
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while the budget constraint of the infertile individual changes to  
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The utility-maximizing fertile individual demands children according to  () 0
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'2 = − t
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t k k = . Furthermore, in both 
lifetime situations the individual will choose the same levels of consumption and leisure 












t , , ,
* * = = = = = . The government budget is fulfilled:()T S θ θ = − 1 . 
           Q . E . D .  
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With neutrality towards inequality, all individuals whether fertile or not have the same 
weight in the social welfare function. Maximizing the Harsanyi welfare function means to 
equalize the marginal utility of consumption and leisure for both types of individuals. Due 
to their budget constraint parents with children have lower levels of consumption and 
leisure than infertile couples. This implies that their marginal utility is higher than that of 
infertile individuals. Equalizing marginal utilities then requires the redistribution of 
resources from infertile to fertile individuals. 
 
If the central planner is completely averse towards inequality ( −∞ → ρ ) he maximizes 
() () ( ) () ( ) []
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Proposition 6: At the first-best allocation of a central planner being completely averse 
towards inequality resources are redistributed from the fertile to the infertile individual. 
 
Proof:  
The central planer’s maximization problem (22) can be written as: 
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and the two constraints of (23). 
   15
From the first constraint of (23) and (24) follows with  ( ) 0 2 >
F









t L L and c c < > . 
 
It is more costly for the infertile individual to finance her consumption and leisure level 
than it is for the fertile individual. Otherwise in achieving the same utility level the fertile 
individual would choose to have no children and the same consumption and leisure level as 
the infertile. Since both individuals have the same endowment this implies a redistribution 
from the fertile to the infertile individual at the first-best allocation.      Q.E.D. 
 
In the case of complete inequality aversion, the Rawlsian welfare function assigns no 
weight to individuals with utility higher than the minimum. The optimal welfare is 
achieved with an equalization of utility levels. Since infertile individuals have a lower 
utility level than fertile resources have to be transferred to the infertile.  
 
The difference in results for redistribution in both cases goes back to the weight given to 
individual types in both kinds of welfare functions. In the inequality neutral case all 
individual types have the same weight. Maximizing the aggregate utility sum means that 
redistribution has to go into the direction of the individuals with the higher marginal utility: 
to the fertile. In the case of complete inequality aversion only the utility level of the least 
favored counts. Thus resources have to redistributed to the individual type with the lowest 





In this paper we discuss the second-best implications of a pension type which is contingent 
on the individual numbers of children of a pensioner. In an overlapping generations model 
with endogenous fertility and labor supply we transform the government’s decision 
problem of choosing the relevant pension parameters in a standard optimal-taxation 
problem with taxes on consumption and children. Our main results are the following. 
 
A child pension should never completely replace a Bismarckian pension scheme in the 
most relevant case of children being more complementary to leisure than consumption 
goods. The reason is that the elimination of a Bismarck pension in favor of a child pension 
increases labor-leisure distortions by too much. Indeed, a mix of both pension types would 
balance the distortions of labor supply and fertility and produce a second-best optimum.  
 
Alternative measures of family policy within the pension system - as the deduction of 
rearing costs from pension contributions – or outside the pension system – as child benefits 
– are equivalent instruments to set fertility incentives.  
 
Finally, a fertility tax has a justification as an insurance against childlessness only if the 
government’s attitude is sufficiently averse towards an unequal treatment of fertile and 
infertile individuals. If the central planner’s attitude to inequality is neutral, the optimal   16
redistribution goes from the childless to those with children, funded through a lump sum 
tax on the childless.  
 
It should be noted that some features of child pensions have not been captured by our 
model and deserve further examination. Child pensions set financial incentives for fertility 
relatively late in an individual’s life cycle. Thus, they are equivalent to other instruments of 
family policy which come to the aid of families earlier in life only if capital markets are 
perfect. If liquidity is especially tight for young families and future pensions cannot be 
perfectly advanced by capital markets policy instruments like child benefits or a rebate of 
pension contributions per child may be preferable to child pensions.  
 
Furthermore, we have not analyzed the political credibility of pension reforms. The 
introduction of child pensions is a promise to help families in the far future after 30 years or 
so. This is a long time horizon susceptible to revoking policies of future governments. 
Other financial aids with immediate execution are more credible and, hence, allow to 
influence fertility more effectively.  
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